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SUMMARY 
This paper presents a risk-averse stochastic bi-level programming approach to solve decision-making of a 
retailer in a competitive market under uncertainties. The retailer decides the level of involvement in day-ahead 
(DA) and regulation markets by making an optimal bidding strategy with the goal of expected profit 
maximization. Uncertainties associated with DA prices, up/down regulation market prices, customers’ demand 
and rival retailers’ behaviors are tackled through a stochastic programming model. In the proposed model 
responsive loads and electric vehicles (EVs) track the real-time prices and choose the proper retailer to 
minimize their payments in the competitive trading floor. The obtained nonlinear stochastic model is 
transformed into an equivalent linear single-level program by replacing the lower-level problem with its 
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions and using duality theory. Finally, the proposed methodology is 
evaluated by applying to a realistic case study and the results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
framework. 
 
Index Terms—Demand response (DR), conditional value at risk (CVaR), competitive market, electric vehicle 
(EV), stochastic bi-level program. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Retailers, as one of the main players of the electricity market, can purchase energy from different 
sources to supply their customers [1]-[3]. The objective of a retailer is to maximize its expected 
profit and to satisfy the electricity demands by optimal purchasing energy and offering proper 
prices to the end users. During the trading process, a retailer normally encounters different 
uncertainties in both market and demand side. Therefore, to avoid experiencing very low profits 
in some unfavorable scenarios, the retailer should consider a certain risk level in the decision-
making problem. Moreover, the customers may be encouraged to manage their consumption 
patterns especially in in emergency conditions. In this regard, within a robust optimization 
approach, decision making problem of electricity retailers with considering the effect of DR 
programs on total procurement cost, is proposed in [4]. In [5], a stochastic dispatch model for 
responsive load is developed in order to investigate the effect of price‐based DR programs in a 
microgrid environment.  
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In future smart grids, demand-side resources can play a more active role in decision-making 
problem of the retailer. New technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs), as flexible resources at 
the demand side, bring significant challenges to the retailer’s decision-making process by their 
charging and discharging behavior [6]. When EV acts in vehicle-to-grid mode, it works as a source 
providing energy for the grid [7]. In this condition, a retailer can play a critical role as an 
intermediary between consumers and the system operators [8], by aggregating EVs for 
participation in energy market [6]. Moreover, a retailer as a demand response (DR) aggregator 
may act like brokers between DR resources and system operator in electricity markets. In some 
studies, authors have presented optimal algorithms for scheduling the flexible loads and 
investigated their impacts on the demand patterns or electricity cost [9] and [10]. But, they have 
not considered the retailers’ procurement plan in details. Decision-making strategies for retailer 
participating in electricity markets have also been investigated in several research works. Some of 
these works address decision-making problem of EVs aggregator as a retailer to participate in 
energy market [11]-[15]. For example, a bi-level programming approach has been proposed in [10] 
based on the Stackelberg game model. In [12], a bidding strategy for EV aggregator has been 
proposed to minimize the expected electricity costs considering price volatility. Authors in [13] 
present a fuzzy information gap decision theory based framework for electricity retailers to 
determine the energy acquisition strategy. Additionally, the point estimate method is proposed to 
deal with the uncertainty of rivals’ strategies. A theoretical model of the competition between DR 
aggregators for selling energy previously stored in an aggregation of storage devices given 
sufficient demand from other aggregators through an incomplete information game is proposed in 
[14]. The performance of a plug-in EV aggregator in electricity markets is proposed in [15] in 
which the aggregator maximizes the profit and optimizes EV owners’ revenue by applying changes 
in tariffs to compete with other market players for retaining current customers and acquiring new 
owners. In [16], unlike the usual market operations, it has been assumed that the aggregator’s 
bidding influences the market prices. In the same work, the effect of the aggregator's bidding 
strategy on the prices has been analyzed via a bi-level program.  
Most of the reviewed literatures have not addressed the competition among players in the decision-
making problem. Also, some of them have not considered the preferences of EV owners and their 
discharging process in the scheduling program of the aggregator. In some other research works, 
decision-making strategies for retailers with considering both EVs and other flexible demands 
have been studied in [17]-[19]. In [17] a bidding strategy for retailers with flexible demands has 
been presented to maximize its expected profit. In the same work, a stochastic programming has 
been used to manage the uncertainties of spot price, regulating price, customers’ behaviors with 
considering price based-DR programs. Moreover, in [19] and [20] the same structures have been 
presented for bidding strategies of retailer for energy trading in day-ahead (DA) market. In [20] 
optimal scheduling problem of plug-in EV aggregators in electricity market considering different 
uncertainties is discussed. 
Stochastic programming provides an adequate modeling framework in which decision-making 
problem of the retailer under uncertainties are properly formulated. Moreover, utilization of risk 
measurement tools within the stochastic optimization framework would allow effective risk 
management for a retailer [21]. On the other hand, some of the researchers have developed 
appropriate decision-making models in electricity markets by considering risk management tools 
to encounter the effects of undesired scenarios [22]-[24]. Conditional value at risk (CVaR), as a 
commonly used risk measurement tool, has been applied into the formulation of EV aggregators 
aiming to deal with their profit volatility [22]. Moreover, a stochastic optimization model for 
3 
 
optimal bidding strategy of an EV aggregator has been proposed in [23], where CVaR has been 
used for managing financial risks caused by uncertainties. In the same manner, in [24], a risk-
averse optimal bidding formulation has been proposed for the aggregator at the demand side based 
on CVaR method. The proposed approach ensures the robustness of the DA bidding strategy while 
considering the uncertainties associated with the renewable generation, real-time price, and loads 
demand. A risk-constrained profit maximization for microgrid aggregators with considering DR is 
proposed in [25] where a risk-constrained scenario-based stochastic programming framework is 
proposed to deal with various uncertainties. A bi-level strategic scheduling model is proposed in 
[26] in which the primary objective is to maximize the load serving entity’s profit by optimally 
scheduling energy storage charging/discharging profile. In [27], the interaction between market 
players in DA and real-time markets is modeled via an incomplete information game theory 
algorithm. In this study, the uncertain behavior of responsive customers including plug-in EV 
owners and consumers is modeled and incomplete information game theory is developed. In [26] 
an optimal decision making program for participating EV aggregators in short term electricity 
market is proposed without considering discharge of EVs and responsive loads. In [29], a bi-level 
optimization approach is used, in which the operation problem of the distribution companies and 
the Independent System Operator are modeled in the upper- and lower-level problems, 
respectively. Also, the consumers can purchase their required electricity through distribution 
companies or choose a retailer. In order to compare the highlights and important aspects of this 
paper Table I is also added to show the contributions of the works in view of existing state of the 
art literature. 
In this work a more completed risk-averse model is presented for decision-making problem of 
a retailer in a competitive environment. A stochastic model is developed for a retailer to determine 
the bidding and offering strategies in DA and regulation markets considering both responsive loads 
and EVs. The stochastic model is formulated as a bi-level problem that includes bi-linear products 
of decision variables. The upper-level problem represents the expected profit maximization of the 
retailer considering optimal biding and offering price to the customers while the lower-level 
problem represents the energy cost minimization for customers and EV owners. By using an 
equivalent single-level mixed-integer linear formulation based on Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) 
optimality conditions and duality theory [21], lower-level of the problem is transferred to the 
upper-level and solved by mixed integer liner programing (MILP). Moreover, uncertainties on DA 
prices up/down regulation markets prices, demand of customers’ loads and EVs power together 
with the rival retailers’ prices are taken into account through a stochastic programming model. In 
this study, CVaR index is used to consider the risk that allows the retailer to compare different 
offering strategies by considering the tradeoff between the expected profit and the low-profit risk. 
Also, the effect of different risk levels on decision-making of the retailer is studied through 
appropriate sensitivity analyses. Therefore, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized 
as bellow: 
 A bi-level stochastic framework is provided for decision-making problem of a retailer  to 
decide the optimal level of involvement in DA and regulation markets, as well as to obtain 
proper bidding strategy under uncertainties, 
 A competitive market environment is modeled by considering the reaction of responsive 
loads and charging and discharging of EVs to the prices offered by the retailers, 
 The impact of risk-aversion parameter on the decision making problem of the retailer in a 
realistic case study is studied and the sensitivity of the retailer’s profit to the risk-aversion 
level in a competitive trading floor is analyzed. 
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The rest of paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 explains the proposed decision-making 
strategy. In section 3, the stochastic risk-constrained bi-level decision-making problem is 
formulated. Case studies together with simulation results are presented in section 4. Finally, 
section 5 draws the conclusions and further works. 
 
Table I. The contribution of literatures in in view of existing state of the art. 
Reference 
Bi-level 
modelling 
Competitive 
environment 
Risk 
assessment 
Discharge 
of EVs 
Demand 
response 
[13] -     - - 
[14] -   - -   
[15] -   -   - 
[17] - -   -   
[20] - -     - 
[25] - -   -   
[26]   -    -   - 
[27] -   -     
[28]       - - 
[29]     - -   
This paper           
 
2. PROPOSED DECISION-MAKING STRATEGY 
This study presents a decision-making problem for a retailer in a competitive environment. This 
problem is formulated as a bi-level programming model. In the upper-level, the retailer determines 
optimal volume of energy purchasing from DA and regulation markets and the selling prices 
offered to the clients, so that its expected profit can be maximized. Moreover, the objective of the 
lower-level is to minimize the clients’ costs. Here, it is assumed that the clients including a number 
of EVs and several industrial loads are equipped with smart energy management controllers 
(SEMC) and are able to respond to the electricity prices by adjusting their consumption levels to 
reduce their energy costs. Therefore, based on the offered electricity prices from different retailers, 
EV owners can change their behaviour and demand level, while SEMC in industrial loads can 
participate in DR programs, automatically and adjust the customer consumption to reduce energy 
costs. To this end, SEMC of each industrial load can choose proper retailer by monitoring real-
time prices and can switch to the most competitive retailer in short-term scheduling. This is feasible 
by developing a fast communication media with bidirectional data transfer between the retailers 
and smart loads and the EV charging stations. It should be noted that the clients have not gotten 
involved each day in the process, but this act is done by SEMC system and therefore it is not 
difficult and burdensome in practice for the clients [19]. 
Based on the offered electricity prices from different retailers, EV owners can change their 
behavior and demand level, while industrial loads can participate in DR programs and adjust their 
consumption to reduce energy costs. The framework of the bi-level decision-making problem is 
illustrated in Figure 1. In energy trading phase, the retailer encounters different uncertainties 
including prices of DA market, up/down regulation markets, rival retailers’ prices as well as 
demand of customers’ and EVs. These uncertainties can be modeled by using scenario generation 
and reduction techniques. In this study, a proper probability density function (PDF) is used for 
each stochastic variable to model its forecasting errors [29].  
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Figure 1. The structure of bi-level decision-making problem for retailer’s participation in DA and 
balancing energy markets. 
 
Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS) and roulette wheel mechanism (RWM) are used to generate a large 
number of scenarios representing the uncertain parameters based on their corresponding PDFs over 
the examined period [32]. To mitigate the computational burden of the stochastic programming, 
K-means algorithm [33] is then used to reduce the number of scenarios into a smaller set providing 
well enough the uncertainties. The reduced scenarios are applied to the stochastic bi-level model 
to solve the decision-making problem.  
    In the upper-level of the problem, the amount of traded energy and the offered prices to the 
clients would be obtained. Moreover, in this level, offered prices for discharge of EVs is also 
determined. In the lower-level, the industrial loads and EVs demand choose their retailer based on 
the offering prices. It should be noted that each industrial customer has some responsive loads that 
can participate in price based-DR program and adjust their consumption. By implementing DR 
programs and energy management of EVs, the share of each retailer to supply the industrial loads 
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and EVs demand are determined and apply to the upper-level program. Furthermore, because the 
retailer encounters different uncertainties in its decision-making problem, it is required to 
investigate its expected profit in different levels of risk aversion. In this regard, the sensitivity of 
the retailer’s profit to the risk aversion parameter is analyzed.  
 
3. THE FRAMEWORK OF MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
Here, a short term trading floor including the DA market, and a real-time energy balancing 
mechanism is considered. It is assumed that the retailer has no market power capability in either 
of the aforementioned markets and acts as a price-taker. In this work, competitive environment 
also denotes a situation where competition concerns the retail level and not by exercising market 
power in the different trading floors of electricity markets. Also, the objective of retailer is to 
maximize its expected profits from trading energy in the DA and to minimize the imbalance cost 
incurred in the regulating market as well as supplying the loads and EVs. Each one of the two 
markets is cleared through a single auction process as bellow: 
 The DA market concerning the whole day d is cleared at 10 A.M. of day d-1. Because of 
the significant delay between the closure of this market and the beginning of the energy 
delivery period (14 h), the regulating market is required to take corrective actions to reduce 
or eliminate the differences between the expected demand and the schedule cleared in the 
DA market. 
 The regulating market ensures the real-time balance between the real-time operation and 
the last energy program cleared in the DA market. For this reason, the regulating market 
remains open until 15 min before the delivery hour. Therefore, through this market, energy 
imbalances are corrected and priced. 
In this paper, the bidding strategy of retailer in the DA market is proposed where the retailer 
submits the required volume of energy to this market. In this stage, decisions are made based on 
plausible realizations of the stochastic processes including market prices (DA, and regulating 
prices) and the loads of demand and EVs. Once the DA market price is known for each time period, 
the retailer decides the amount of energy to sell/buy in/from the regulating market. Then, in second 
stage, and for every DA market price realization, decisions are made based on plausible scenarios 
of regulating prices and the required demand of loads and charge/discharge of EVs.  
 
4. RISK-CONSTRAINED STOCHASTIC BI-LEVEL DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM FORMULATION 
4.1. Incorporating Risk Management 
    A risk management criterion is typically used to control the outcome volatility of the problem 
and avoid undesired profit scenarios due to various uncertainties. In the risk-neutral formulation, 
only the expected profit is maximized while the achieved optimal expected profit may include high 
possibility of low profits or even negative profits (losses). Therefore, CVaR as a measurement tool 
is incorporated to the problem of decision-making of the retailer. Mathematically, CVaR at a given 
confidence level α, is defined as below, [34]: 
).
1
1
(max
1
,












CVaR   (1) 
Subject to: 
0;0    profit   (2) 
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where, profit stands for the profit in scenario  ,   as an auxiliary non-negative variable shows 
the difference between auxiliary variable  and the profit  when the profit  is smaller than  and 
 is the probability of scenario  .  
 
4.2.Objective Function of the Problem  
 The objective of the retailer is to maximize its expected profit and minimize the customers’ 
payments confronting with uncertainties. Therefore, a risk-constrained stochastic bi-level structure 
using CVaR measurement tool is provided to the problem. In this aim, through a risk aversion 
parameter β as a weighting factor, CVaR is added to the risk-neutral optimization problem. 
Therefore, the objective function from the retailer’s viewpoint is as follows: 
CVaRprofitMaximize ..
1


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

  (3) 
where the profit  in each scenario   is defined as: 
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The objective function of the upper-level is the sum of the revenues obtained from selling energy 
to the customers, and EVs and participating in down regulation market, minus purchasing energy 
from DA and positive balancing markets as well as buying energy from EVs discharging process.  
     Moreover, the objective of the lower-level of the problem from the customers’ viewpoint can 
be formulated as follow: 
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     In the above equation, index r0 denotes the under-study retailer. The three lines in the left side 
of equation (5) represent the costs of purchased energy from the under-study and rival retailers for 
demand loads and charge/discharge of EVs, respectively. The three lines in the right side of the 
equation represent the reluctance of customers and EV owners to change their retailer for providing 
their loads, charge and discharge of EVs, respectively.  
 
4.3.Constraints of the Problem  
The proposed objective function is subject to the upper-level and lower-level constraints. 
1) Upper-level constraints: Constraint (6) denotes the energy balance for each scenario and at each 
time. In (7)-(9) the share of the under-study retailer to supply loads and EVs’ charge/discharge 
demand are determined. Constraint (10) represents the non-anticipativity that shows identical DA 
bids have to be made in all scenarios with equal DA prices. Moreover, constraints (11) and (12) 
represent the limitation of energy trading in positive and negative balancing market, respectively. 
. 
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2) Lower-level constraints: In (13) the share of each retailer to supply demand loads and EVs 
charge/discharge energies is determined. In (14) the total expected customers demand and 
charge/discharge loads of EVs is obtained. Constraint (15) denotes that all of the loads and EVs 
should be supplied by all of the retailers. In (16) and (17) the limitation of variables are presented. 
Finally, the limitation of energy exchange between retailers and customers is expressed in (18). 
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Moreover, constraints (19)-(22) impose limits on EV battery at each time period that should be 
considered in the problem [29].  
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In addition, there are some of the technical constraints that represent customers’ participation 
in DR programs. In this study, the energy consumption of customers at each hour is determined 
based on the price signal and their demand elasticity [35]. The customers are encouraged to adjust 
their energy consumption by shifting and shedding controllable loads. Therefore, the energy 
consumption changes from inttE to tE in period t as below: 
9 
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int  (23) 
The benefit of customers is obtained as bellow: 
D
tttt EEBES .)()(   (24) 
where, )( tES and )( tEB stand for the benefit and income of customers at period t after implementing 
DR program. The following criteria should be maximized in order to obtain the benefit of 
customers [36]: 
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Based on the model represented in [37], the energy consumption of customers at time t is obtained 
as follows: 
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4.4. Equivalent Linear Single-Level Problem 
The problem explained above is a nonlinear one due to the bilinear product of terms D tr
D
tE ,, 0 , 
Ch
tr
Ch
tE ,, 0
and Distr
Dis
tE ,, 0  in (4). To derive the single-level formulation, the KKT optimality conditions of the 
lower-level problem (5) and (13)-(22) are obtained and incorporated in the upper-level problem. 
Then the bilinear terms are also replaced with their equivalent expressions using the strong duality 
theorem [26] and [21] as bellow: 
     By using KKT conditions and strong duality theorem, the lower-level problem is obtained and 
is solved as a single-level MILP problem [26]. This equivalent problem includes the objective 
function of the upper-level, the constraints of both levels and the equivalent expression of lower-
level objective function. Therefore, the equivalent single-level linear problem with considering 
customers objective is represented as follows: 
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It should be noted that the above objective function is subject to constraints (6)-(22) and (27)-(29) 
as well as those obtained from KKT and duality theory that are presented in Appendix A. 
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5. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL RESULTS 
5.1.Case Study 
A case study based on realistic data from the Nord Pool market [38] is implemented to evaluate 
the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed methodology. The scheduling horizon is 
considered one day which is divided into 24 equal time intervals. In the case study, it is assumed 
that the under-study retailer (Ret0) competes with three rival retailers (Ret1, Ret2 and Ret3) in order 
to supply the energy of industrial loads and a number of EVs. The hourly forecasted demand of 
the customers and EVs are considered as shown in Figure 2. The hourly prices offered by the rival 
retailers are also modeled by three randomly generated scenarios with different probabilities. For 
the sake of simplicity, all EVs are assumed to be the same and only 20% of them participate in 
discharge process. EV owners and responsive loads respond to the price signal based on their price 
elasticity [37]. The initial SoC of EVs at each scenario is randomly generated between 0-1 pu. 
Also, the initial hourly demands of customers and EVs supplied by each retailer ( 0rX ) are also 
generated randomly. Furthermore, DA and up/down-regulation prices are obtained from the DK-
West area in the Nord Pool market during September 2016, and shown in Figure 3.  
     A number of 1000 initial scenarios are generated using MCS and RWM strategies to model the 
forecasted errors. Then, K-means algorithm is also implemented to reduce the initial scenarios into 
a set of 45 selected scenarios that represent well enough the uncertainties. Finally, the reduced 
scenarios are applied to the proposed decision-making model to maximize the expected profit of 
the under-study retailer. The optimization is carried out by CPLEX solver using GAMS software 
[39] on a PC with 4 GB of RAM and Intel Core i7 @ 2.60 GHz processor. 
 
Figure 2. The hourly forecasted demand of the customers’ loads and EVs. 
 
 
Figure 3. The forecasted electricity prices of DA, up and down regulation markets. 
 
5.2.Numerical Results 
The proposed approach is applied to the case study and risk-constrained decision-making of the 
retailer is analyzed in different modes of EVs operation (grid-to-vehicle (G2V) and V2G) as well 
as responsive loads participation in DR programs. The expected profit of the under-study retailer 
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(Ret0) versus CVaR and its standard deviation for different values of β are shown in Figure 4 (a) 
and (b), respectively. In this study, the confidence level to compute CVaR is considered 95% in 
all instances. As can be observed, by increasing β the expected profit decreases and CVaR 
increases in all cases. The maximum profit at the minimum CVaR is attained when the retailer has 
no risk aversion decision. By increasing β, the expected profit of the retailer decreases, however 
the average expected profit of the worst-case scenarios increases, thus, the risk exposure is 
mitigated. The expected profit and CVaR varies from 298.534€ and -39.816€ (for β = 0) to 
246.159€ and -5.953€ (for β = 5), respectively whichdenotes a reduction of 17.5% in the expected 
profit and 85.04% increase in the CVaR. The negative CVaR represents that the profit in some 
scenarios is negative, showing that there is a probability of experiencing financial losses.  
     It is observed that for lower values of β, the expected profit is not highly dependent on the risk-
aversion of the retailer. However, the CVaR increases severely by increasing β. This also implies 
that a small decrease in the expected profit can be used to reduce efficiently the risk of profit 
variability. Therefore, based on the efficient frontier profile the retailer can decide its degree of 
risk-aversion to participate in the competitive electricity markets in different cases. Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 4 (b), with increasing β, the standard deviation of the retailer’s profit decreases. 
In fact, when the retailer tries to hedge against volatilities, the low probable profits in undesired 
scenarios are eliminated. But, when the retailer becomes less risk-averse, its profits become more 
dispersed and far from their expected values. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4. Expected profit of the retailer versus, (a) CVaR, (b) Standard deviation of the expected 
profit. 
 
     The hourly energy purchased by the retailer from the DA and up/down regulation markets for 
different values of β is shown in Figure 5. The retailer purchases high amount of the required 
energy from DA market and covers the effects of uncertainties by trading energy in regulation 
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markets. As can be observed, the retailer in the risk-neutral case (β=0) provides most of the 
customers’ energy need from DA market. However, by increasing β, energy procurement from DA 
market decreases at some hours, especially during 14:00 to 16:00 due to the price volatility in DA 
market as compared to the regulation markets. In this condition, the retailer needs to compensate 
the energy deviations in the expensive up-regulation market which in turn imposes further cost of 
energy provision. 
    In addition, it is observed from Figure 5 (c) that, by increasing risk aversion factor, the 
participation of the retailer in down-regulation market decreases to hedge against the volatilities 
of this trading floor. Also, it is observed that regardless of β values, the retailer bids for load 
decrement when down-regulation prices are high (from 14:00 to 16:00) to achieve more revenue. 
In fact, this procedure indicates that the retailer can adapt to hedge against profit volatility with 
trading less energy in DA market in the hope that energy deviations can be compensated in the up-
regulation market with less volatile prices. Moreover, its participation in the volatile down-
regulation market mitigates as it behaves more risk-averse. 
 
(a)  
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5. Energy procurement by the under-study retailer from, (a) DA market, (b) up-regulation 
market, and (c) down-regulation market. 
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The hourly charging and discharging prices offered by all the retailers is shown in Figure 6. For 
the sake of simplicity, the DR tariff and charging prices are the same. As shown, prices offered by 
retailer 2 are the highest at the peak hours and are the lowest in off-peak periods. Retailer 1 mostly 
offers moderate prices compared to retailers 2 and 3. As can be seen, the under-study retailer offers 
competitive prices most of the times to stay in the game for energy exchange. Furthermore, the 
discharge prices offered by the examined retailer are relatively high to attract more EV owners. In 
fact, when the markets prices are relatively high, the retailer prefers to purchase energy from the 
EV owners instead of the expensive market. Likewise, it offers the lowest prices for discharging 
at some hours especially during 14:00 to 16:00 when the DA and up-regulation markets have low 
prices (see Figure 3). 
     In order to investigate the behavior of the retailer encountering uncertain resources, its optimal 
offering prices in different values of risk-aversion parameter are shown in Figure 7. As observed, 
by increasing β, the price signals don’t vary substantially due to the fact that in a competitive 
market, an increase in the selling prices offered by a given retailer can easily motivate customers 
to join other retailers as energy supplier.  Therefore, in order to stay in the game, the retailer should 
not increase the selling price, significantly. However, when it behaves more risk-averse, it 
increases the selling prices in some hours slightly to compensate the extra cost incurred due to 
participation in expensive markets. With the same reason, the retailer does not decrease offered 
discharge prices significantly in order to keep a reasonable market share while making profit. 
      
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 6. Hourly price signal offered by different retailers, (a) charging prices, and (b) 
discharging prices. 
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sector of the pie charts represents the percentage of the expected value of energy that is supplied 
by the associated retailer. As it can be seen, by increasing the value of risk-aversion from β = 0 to 
β = 5, the market share of the retailer decreases around 42%. Moreover, when the retailer is more 
risk-averse, its share in providing charge demand decreases. In other words, by increasing β, the 
procurement of the retailer from DA market decreases and it purchases more energy from 
expensive up-regulation market. Consequently, it offers higher charge prices to compensate the 
payments which in turn lead to lower number of clients and market share.  
     As mentioned before, the discharge price offered by the under-study retailer is such that to 
attract the EV owners for discharge process. Therefore, the share of the retailer in purchasing the 
discharge energy from EVs is the highest (39%). However, when the risk-aversion parameter 
increases, the offered prices by the retailer for discharging actions decreases slightly which leads 
to the lower market share. 
 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
Figure 7. Hourly price signal offered by the retailer in different values of β, (a) charging prices, 
and  (b) discharging prices. 
 
    As explained before, with increasing β, the retailer’s share decreases in a competitive market. 
Table II shows the percentage of customers’ demand transferred between the retailers for different 
values of β at two sample hours. It should be noted that the minus sign (-) denotes a demand shift 
in the opposite direction. As can be observed, for example at 8:00, the transferred percentage of 
customers and EVs does not change as the value of β increases. That can be as a result of 
unchanged charge and discharge prices as shown in Figure 7. On the other hand, at 15:00, around 
10 % of the responsive loads change the serving entity and go from Ret1 to Ret0 in β=0. The same 
happens in β=5 where a demand transfer of 2.23% happens between Ret0 and Ret1.  
     The EVs’ charge and discharge demand transferring among retailers also follows the same 
pattern. It can be seen that at 15:00, the transferred percentage of EVs’ charging load from Ret0 to 
Ret1 increases from 1.01% in β=0 to 3.49% in β=5. In the same manner, the transfer of customers 
among retailers and different hours can be analyzed.  
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     Table III shows the expected energy exchanged between the retailer and the network in DA and 
up/down regulation markets in different values of β. As shown, with increasing β from 0 to 5, the 
retailer’s participation in DA and negative balancing market changes from 37.353 and 9.936MWh 
to 19.651 and 4.013MWh; which shows a reduction of 47.3% and 59.6%, respectively. In other 
words, when the retailer becomes more risk-averse, it procures less blocks of energy from more 
volatile markets. Numerical results of Table III also demonstrate that by increasing β from 0 to 
1.8, the retailer purchases more energy from up-regulation market (from 3.240MWh to 
4.002MWh) which has a more stable nature. However, further increase of the risk-aversion factor, 
results in less energy purchases from the up-regulation trading floor since the retailer increases the 
charging price signals and decreases the discharging price offers as shown in Figure 7.  
 
       
 
(a) 
 
  
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
Figure 8. Share of different retailers in supplying demand, (a) demand of customers,  (b) 
charging demand of EVs, and (c) discharging demand of EVs. 
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Table II. Transferred percentage of customers demand between the retailers in different β 
Risk 
aversion 
parameter 
Options 
From Ret0 
to Ret1 
From Ret0 
to Ret2 
From Ret0 
to Ret3 
From Ret1 
to Ret2 
From 
Ret1 to 
Ret3 
From Ret2 
to Ret3 
 At 8:00  
β =0 
Responsive loads 18.74 2.11 -9.06 -16.63 -27.8 -11.17 
Charge of PEVs 18.73 2.11 9.06 -16.62 -27.79 -11.17 
Discharge of 
PEVs 
-17.64 -12.62 -30.5 5.02 -12.86 -17.88 
β=1.5 
Responsive loads 18.73 2.11 -9.06 -16.62 -27.79 -11.17 
Charge of PEVs 18.73 2.18 -9.06 -16.62 -27.79 -11.17 
Discharge of 
PEVs 
-17.64 -12.62 -30.5 5.02 -12.86 -17.88 
β=5 
Responsive loads 18.74 2.11 -9.06 -16.63 -27.8 -11.17 
Charge of PEVs 18.73 2.11 -9.06 -16.62 -27.79 -11.17 
Discharge of 
PEVs 
-17.65 12.63 -30.51 5.02 -12.86 -17.88 
 At 15:00  
β =0 
Responsive loads -9.81 -6.951 -17.87 2.86 -8.06 -10.96 
Charge of EVs 1.01 14.74 -7.04 13.73 -8.05 -21.78 
Discharge of 
EVs 
18.18 9.43 -3.24 -8.75 -21.42 -12.67 
β=1.5 
Responsive loads 2.23 17.23 -5.77 15 -8 -23 
Charge of EVs 2.23 17.15 -5.83 14.92 -8.06 -22.98 
Discharge of 
EVs 
18.31 9.52 -3.14 -8.79 -21.45 -12.66 
β=5 
Responsive loads 2.23 17.21 -5.83 14.98 -8.06 -23.44 
Charge of EVs 3.49 18.41 -3.31 14.92 -6.8 -21.72 
Discharge of 
EVs 
18.31 9.52 -3.14 -8.79 -21.45 -12.66 
 
Table III. Expected energy exchanged by the under-study retailer in different markets (in MWh) 
β DA  Up-Regulation  Down-Regulation  
0 37.353 3.240 9.936 
1 37.080 3.819 9.904 
1.5 35.369 4.002 9.017 
1.8 33.655 4.002 8.226 
2 21.380 3.553 4.433 
3 21.223 3.522 4.388 
5 19.651 3.499 4.013 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper a risk-averse bi-level stochastic programming model was proposed for decision-
making problem of a retailer in a competitive environment considering different uncertain 
recourses. In this problem, optimal energy purchasing by the retailer in the DA and regulating 
markets and its optimal selling prices to the clients was determined on a day scheduling horizon. 
Due to the uncertainties of markets and rivals’ prices as well as the ones associated with demand’s 
behavior, CVaR was incorporated into the optimal scheduling problem to model the risk-averse 
behavior of the retailer. The nonlinear stochastic bi-level programming problem was transformed 
into its equivalent single-level problem by using mathematical methods. The proposed strategy 
was also applied on a realistic case study to show its applicability and effectiveness. The main 
results of this work can be summarized as fallow:   
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 The expected profit of a given retailer depends on the risk-aversion level β. It was observed 
form the simulation results that by increasing β value, the expected profit and its standard 
deviation decrease while CVaR increases which accordingly denotes that the retailer makes 
less profits but in a more reliable way.  
 In a risk-neutral case (β=0), the retailer tends to meet most of the demanded energy using DA 
market contracts, but in a risk-averse case (β=5) its energy procurement from DA market 
decreases. In fact, when β increases, the retailer can adapt to hedge against profit volatility in 
the presence of a regulation market; trading less energy in DA market in the hope that extra 
demand can be compensated through regulation markets. 
 When β increases, the retailer changes its bidding strategy in a way to increase charge prices 
and decrease discharge prices to make more profit. However, this action is normally followed 
by a lower market share which in turn affects the retailer’s profit negatively.  Therefore, in a 
competitive environment, considering risk exposure can influence the decision-making of the 
retailer, substantially.  
Future efforts will be mainly focused on the application of the proposed model in larger test 
systems with more competitive players and investigating the effects of competition among retailers 
on the system’s security and reliability. 
 
Appendix A. 
In order to incorporate the upper level and lower level of the problem, the following steps are 
applied to the problem: 
 For a given vector of upper-level variables, the Lagrangian function of the lower-level problem 
is obtained as bellow: 
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where, 
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 ,r   are the Lagrangian multipliers. 
 In addition to the primal feasibility constraints of the lower level, the KKT necessary optimality 
conditions of the lower-level problem would be obtained by partial derivative of the Lagrangian 
function. 
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 The nonlinear complementary slackness conditions are equivalently expressed as a set of 
linear constraints as following: 
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 Duality theory is applied to the problem as bellow: 
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Also, with considering the following relations: 
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The bilinear product of terms
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Appendix B 
In this paper, in order to determine the price of the energy replacing the deviations, a mechanism 
for imbalance prices is used. Based on this mechanism, a price for the positive energy deviation 
(lower consumption than the scheduled one) and a price for the negative energy deviation (higher 
consumption than scheduled one) are settled for each time period. These prices are determined 
such that to counteract the unplanned deviations, and consequently, they represent the cost of the 
energy required to be compensated. These prices depend on the sign of the imbalance occurred in 
the system as follow: 
To apply two-price system, as supposed in this paper, the single balancing price Bt , is split up 
into two prices for each period including  
B
t and 
B
t . The price 
B
t is paid by a balancing 
responsible party in case it deviates positively by an energy amount denoted by 
B
tE . In opposite, 
the balancing responsible party receives the price 
B
t  for the negative energy deviation denoted 
by 
B
tE . In these two-price systems, the difference in DA market price 
D
t and balancing price 
B
t
is taken to obtain what is referred to as the imbalance that is DAt
B
t
I
t   , therefore, the two 
prices can be obtained as follows: 
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Where, RTt is the real time price. It is rational that those consumers who incur excess consumption 
than the scheduled one, should pay for it and those who reduce their consumption (or even 
discharge their EVs) when the system occurs with low production and high consumption, should 
buy the energy requirement with lower prices (or be paid for the volume of energy injected). 
 
 
 
Nomenclature 
Sets and indices 
,)( t  At time t and scenario . 
,)( t  At time t and scenario . 
Ch (Dis) Charge (Discharge) process. 
D  Demand load of customers (MW). 
)(', rNrr  Indices (set) of retailers. 
  Index that represents charge and discharge of PEVs and also demand loads of customers. 
  ( ) Scenario index (set) of rival retailers’ prices.  
t (T) Index (set) of time periods. 
ω (Ω) Scenario index (set) of market prices, demand loads and charge/discharge of PEVs. 
 
Variables 
)( Zr
X
r ee  Auxiliary binary variable used in complementary slackness conditions. 
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E  The amount of energy supplied by the under-study retailer (MWh). 
)(
 BB EE  Energy traded in positive (negative) balancing markets (MWh). 
DA
tE ,  
Energy traded in day-ahead market (MWh). 
K  
The cost modelling the reluctance of customers and PEV owners to (go from retailer s  to retailer 
's (€). 
vRe  The revenue of the under study retailer (€). 
rX  Percentage of customers supplied by rival retailers. 
0rX  Percentage of customers supplied by the under study retailer. 
',rrZ  Percentage of customers shifted between the retailers. 
)( r  Lagrange multipliers.
 SoC  State of charge of PEV. 
 
Parameters 
)( ,, httt ElasElas  
Self-elasticity (cross-elasticity) of demand of customers. 
TE
 
Total demand of customers (MWh). 
tE

 Total expected demand of customers (MWh). 
0
rX  Initial percentage of loads and PEVs demand supplied by each retailer. 
  Probability of scenario . 
)(
 BB   Positive (negative) balancing market prices (€/MWh). 
DA
 
Price of day-ahead market (€/MWh). 
)(
0rr
  Price signals offered by rival (under study) retailer (€/MWh). 
  Probability of scenario  . 
)( DisCh   Coefficient of charge (discharge) efficiency. 
SoC  ( SoC ) Minimum (maximum) of SoC. 
CapE  Energy capacity of PEV (MWh). 
P  Limitation of maximum energy traded with the network (MWh). 
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